For They Shall See Good (網上系內研討會)

摘要：

Are the smartest, most knowledgeable among us also the best among us? Or are all the moral saints you know especially knowledgeable? Maybe not. At first blush, it may not seem like there is any especially strong connection between one’s moral and epistemic standing—between how good one is and how knowledgeable one is. And yet, more than a few influential philosophers say otherwise. They say there is some very tight, very important connection between one’s moral and epistemic standing. In this paper, I sympathetically examine various versions of this claim. I start by clarifying the terrain and narrowing my focus to the kind of moral and epistemic traits that I take to be most plausibly connected. Then I assess several arguments that purport to establish such a connection. My goal is not to conclusively show that there is a non-accidental, non-coincidental connection between a person’s moral and epistemic character but rather to draw out and discuss some of the appeal of this very old idea from a contemporary perspective.

英語主講
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