The Naturalistic Impossibility of Agent-specific Possibilities (Departmental Seminar)

Abstract:

Many thinkers – analytic philosophers, pre-analytic philosophers, and scientists alike – have argued for “agent-specific possibilities” (ASP), by which we mean alternative possibilities specifically for the agent that operate within a deterministic physical world. List recently provides a famous multiple realizability model of the view. We argue that previous critiques of the model have overlooked a core argument therein, namely that the assessment should assume an “agential level only” theoretical starting point that starts only from a higher-level perspective. However, through our novel metaphysical and probabilistic analyses, which show that an agential state is inseparably connected to a specific underlying physical state despite its apparent multiple realizability, we demonstrate that ASP theories are ultimately incompatible with a naturalistic worldview.

Delivered in English.
All are welcome.