NOONAN, Harold
Visiting Professor
| BA (Cambridge University); PhD (Cambridge University) | |
| Rm | FKH 436 |
| harold.noonan@nottingham.ac.uk |
Brief Biography
Present Appointment
Since August 2004 Professor of Mind and Cognition, University of Nottingham
Previous Academic Appointments
1999 – 2004 Professor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1991 – 99 Senior Lecturer and Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1979 – 91 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1975 – 78 Research Fellow, Trinity Hall, Cambridge
1999 – 2004 Professor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1991 – 99 Senior Lecturer and Reader, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1979 – 91 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Birmingham
1975 – 78 Research Fellow, Trinity Hall, Cambridge
Research Interests
- Metaphysics
- Philosophy of Language
- Philosophy of Mind
- History of Philosophy (with a particular interest in David Hume)
Selected Publications
Books:
2019. Personal identity 3rd ed. London: Routledge
2012. Kripke and Naming and Necessity London: Routledge
2007. Hume Oxford: Oneworld Press
2001. Frege: a critical introduction Cambridge: Polity
1999. Hume on knowledge London: Routledge
1980. Objects and identity Boston: Kluwer
2019. Personal identity 3rd ed. London: Routledge
2012. Kripke and Naming and Necessity London: Routledge
2007. Hume Oxford: Oneworld Press
2001. Frege: a critical introduction Cambridge: Polity
1999. Hume on knowledge London: Routledge
1980. Objects and identity Boston: Kluwer
Recent Publications:
2024
There are more, or fewer, things than we ordinarily think Metaphysica https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2023-0035
2023
Fission Self Interest and Common Sense Ethics’ Philosophia 51(3): 1509-1520. 2023.
Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self: Bloomsbury
The Personite Problem and the Stage-Theoretic Reply. Organon F, 29(2), 275-282
‘The First person’ and the first person. In Teichmann, R. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe. Oxford University Press 2022. Chapter 18.
All designators are rigid. Metaphysica.24(1): 01-107.
Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self: Bloomsbury
The Personite Problem and the Stage-Theoretic Reply. Organon F, 29(2), 275-282
‘The First person’ and the first person. In Teichmann, R. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe. Oxford University Press 2022. Chapter 18.
All designators are rigid. Metaphysica.24(1): 01-107.
2022
Concepts may still be objects Organon F 2022 (3): 376-388.In Tobia, K. (ed.) Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self Bloomsbury 2022.Chapter 5.
Identity [online encyclopaedia contribution] (with Curtis B.). 2022 update. In: E.N. ZALTA, ed., Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, CA, USA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University.
Identity [online encyclopaedia contribution] (with Curtis B.). 2022 update. In: E.N. ZALTA, ed., Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, CA, USA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University.
2021
The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence. In J. Noller (Ed.), The unity of a person: philosophical perspectives. (Co-authored with Curtis, C.) Routledge 23-39
The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence. In J. Noller (Ed.), The unity of a person: philosophical perspectives. (Co-authored with Curtis, C.) Routledge 23-39