Are Primitive Brute Facts Metaphysically Troublesome? (Departmental Seminar)

Abstract:

Brute facts are intriguing and, for philosophers, intuitively unsettling. Nevertheless, most contemporary metaphysicians are inclined to the view that some facts are, indeed, brute. While some candidates for the status of being a brute fact are ontologically basic, or primitive, others are ontologically non-basic, or emergent. Many philosophers believe that the concept of an emergent brute fact is troublesome, arguing that if an entity X arises lawfully from out of more basic conditions there must be something about those conditions in virtue of which X exists, and is what it is. In contrast, there is a widely held assumption that primitive brute facts are metaphysically untroublesome since, however unintuitive they may appear, they simply represent the way things ultimately are.

In this talk, I challenge this latter view, arguing that at least some candidates for the status of primitive brute facts are metaphysically troublesome. In brief, the idea is that a (putative) brute fact F is metaphysically troublesome if its alleged actual existence constitutes a theoretical paradox. Under such circumstances, F’s very conditions of possibility appear to be absent, constituting what may be rightly called a transcendental conundrum. I first argue that transcendental concerns lie at the heart of our familiar troubles with emergent brute facts. I then show how similar concerns apply with respect to at least one class of primitive brute facts — brute concomitance — thereby demonstrating that ontological primitiveness provides no waterproof shielding from transcendental concerns. Finally, I comment on some possible expansions of the argument as well as on its potential overall significance.  

Delivered in English.
All are welcome.