Jessica Wilson

Prof. Jessica Wilson
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto

Jessica Wilson (PhD Cornell University, 2002) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto (first arriving in 2005); she was Regular Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh (2013–2016), and William Wilhartz Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan (2001–2005). In 2014, Wilson was co-recipient of the Lebowitz Prize for Philosophical Achievement and Contribution, and in 2022, Wilson was named the University of Toronto Scarborough Research Excellence Faculty Scholar. Wilson has been awarded many grants, including three multi-year Social Science and Humanities Research Council grants, and many visiting fellowships, including to the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, the University of Milan, the Instituto de Investigadores Filosóficos (UNAM), the Arché Centre for Metaphysics, Language, Logic and Epistemology (St. Andrews), and the Centre for Consciousness (Australian National University). Wilson is a past President of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science, and is currently an editor of Nous.

Wilson’s research focuses on general metaphysics, metaphysics of science and mind, epistemology, and philosophical methodology, and she has published extensively on these topics. Some representative publications include Metaphysical Emergence (Oxford University Press, 2021), ‘Three Barriers to Philosophical Progress’ (2017), ‘The A Priority of Abduction’ (2017, with Stephen Biggs), ‘No Work for a Theory of Grounding’ (2014), ‘A Determinable-based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy’ (2013), ‘Relativized Metaphysical Modality’ (2012, with Adam Murray), ‘What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe it? (2010), and ‘On Characterizing the Physical’ (2006).

The Insuperable Problem of Other AI Minds

poster
Monday, 8 April 2024
4:30 – 6:30 pm
Cho Yiu Conference Hall (with synchronous online broadcast)

Joining the Face-to-Face Talks (Please register by 4 April 2024): https://cloud.itsc.cuhk.edu.hk/webform/view.php?id=13684365

Joining the Talks Online (No registration is needed):
Zoom Meeting ID: 957 0183 7605
Link: https://cuhk.zoom.us/j/95701837605

For inquiries, please email to philosophy@cuhk.edu.hk

Abstract:

The question of whether AI systems of sufficient complexity are conscious has been much in the news of late, especially as regards large language models such as LaMDA, ChatGPT, and GPT-4. But can we know or justifiably believe that a given AI system is conscious? Here I canvass strategies offered in response to the problem of other minds—the question of how we can warrantedly establish that persons or other animals are conscious—and argue that these strategies won’t work for the case of AI, for reasons that appear to be insuperable. I conclude that we are not now, and will likely never be in position to warrantedly establish of any AI system that it is conscious.

Conducted in English
All are welcome

Fundamentality and Metaphysical Dependence

12/4 (Fri.), 2:30 – 5:15pm, LSK 212
19/4 (Fri.), 2:30 – 5:15pm, LSK 212
26/4 (Fri.), 2:30 – 5:15pm, LSK 212
3/5 (Fri.), 2:30 – 5:15pm, LSK 212

Determinable-based Persistence through Change

poster
Monday, 22 April 2024
4:30 – 6:30 pm
Room 220, Fung King Hey Building

Joining the Face-to-Face Talks (Please register by 18 April 2024): https://cloud.itsc.cuhk.edu.hk/webform/view.php?id=13684365

Joining the Talks Online (No registration is needed):
Zoom Meeting ID: 957 0183 7605
Link: https://cuhk.zoom.us/j/95701837605

For inquiries, please email to philosophy@cuhk.edu.hk

Abstract:

I offer a new metaphysical account of what it is for an object to persist through change. On my proposed view, when an object undergoes change, this involves the object’s essentially having a determinable property (e.g., shape), which property is differently determined at different times (e.g., first as straight, then as bent). I argue that this account has advantages over existing accounts of persistence through change (including endurantism and perdurantism), including that it makes sense of how objects can be ‘wholly present’ at each time they exist, without inviting contradiction.

Conducted in English
All are welcome