University of Venice , Italy
The first question is, whether phenomenology can think of itself in history as an historical philosophy without falling into some sort of frivolous relativism, indifferent to truth. Husserl¡¦s transcendental absolutism cannot but defend itself against any sort of relativism for the sake of his idea of philosophy as first philosophy. What is then the meaning of his Cartesianism ? Nevertheless Husserl recognises particularly in his late writings that ¡§philosophy must take from history.¡¨ Is this a real contradiction, or can Husserl argue a composition between his indefectible absolutism and the anyway limited room which he makes for the history of philosophy?In any case he never gives up his idea of phenomenology as first philosophy, which means philosophy free from any presupposition, wholly responsible for its thinking and knowledge. The second question is then to throw light upon the roots of this modern conception of philosophy, particularly strengthened before Husserl by the philosophers of German idealism, that is, by the metaphysicians of I-consciousness (subjectivity) and of modern conversion of truth into certainty. From this point takes its origin the third question about meaning and truth, with which deal particularly the last two sections of this paper. How is it possible, to think of the bind between truth and finiteness beyond Husserl¡¦s subjectivism of transcendental ego and the irresolute transcendental intersubjectivity of followers and other philosophers? Is it actually possible, to think of philosophy in history and what does it mean? These questions request that the revolution in phenomenology goes on beyond Heidegger and Lˆmvinas, without forgetting Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, in order to rediscover not the meaning but the truth of radical finiteness, as the relation to the otherness disclosing itself in the words of human conversation and interpretation of existence as being in the world.