University of Louvain, Belgium
In his philosophical education before world war II Levinas owed much to his close study of Husserl and Heidegger. And his personal phenomenology which came out after the war demonstrates a persistent debate with both thinkers, particularly with regard to the specific relation to the history of philosophy which characterizes their phenomenological research.After describing the main features of such relation first in Husserl・s work second in Heidegger・s, the paper is an attempt to show how Levinas, because for him the primordial phenomenon of phenomenology should be the face-toface with the other, objected to Husserl・s reading of the history of philosophy in as much as it takes for granted that the primordial phenomenon is the sensegiving ego cogito; and to show likewise how Levinas objected to Heidegger・s reading of the past for which the primordial phenomenon is supposed to be the self-projection of the finite Dasein. According to Levinas in both cases, though differently, the Same prevails upon the Other.It is well known that in his reappropriation of what in the past paves the way to his transcendental phenomenology, Husserl often paid a major tribute to Descartes, whereas Heidegger, in his attentiveness to what in the past could anticipate his fundamental ontology repeatedly paid a major tribute to Plato. The paper points out Levinas・s objections to Husserl on the bases of a reading of Descartes in which the other plays a decisive role. Similarly it points out Levinas・s objections to Heidegger on the bases of a reading of Plato which is not focused on the Self but on the dialogical.