**Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation**

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[Abstract] The *Exclusion Argument*, which aims to deny the causal efficacy of *irreducible* mental properties, is probably *the* most serious challenge to a non-reductive theory of mind. Many proposed solutions to the exclusion problem can only reject simplified exclusion arguments, but fail to block a sophisticated version I introduced elsewhere. In this paper, I attempt to show that we can refute the sophisticated exclusion argument by appeal to a sophisticated understanding of causation, what I call the ‘Dual-condition Conception of Causation’ (which was primitively, though misleadingly, suggested by David Hume in the*Enquiry*). Specifically, I argue that the dual-condition account of causation gives strong support to the so-called ‘*Autonomy Solution*’, which asserts that even if mental properties are unable to cause physical properties, they can still cause *higher-level*properties (such as mental, behavioral, and social properties)—if so, human agency would be preserved in the physical world.