From the Extended Mind to the Extended Knower

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In their highly influential paper “The extended mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue for what may be called “the parity principle” that “[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, *were it done in the head*, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world *is* (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 8). It is along this line of reasoning that they also argue for the possibility of the extended mind. Recently, based on Clark and Chalmers’ views concerning the extended mind, in his article “The extended knoewer” (2012), Stephen Hetherington argues for the rather strong thesis that both the internalist and externalist views of the nature of knowledge allow for the possibility of the extended knower. In this paper, I argue that if an externalist virtue epistemology is adopted, the notion of the extended knowledge is problematic.