My research centers on epistemology, with a particular focus on epistemic permissivism, higher-order evidence, and Bayesian epistemology. I also have research and teaching interests in decision theory and the philosophy of science. I joined the Chinese University of Hong Kong as an associate professor in January 2026. Before that, I was an associate professor at Wuhan University. I received my PhD from Cornell University in 2016, following my undergraduate studies at Wuhan University.

• Epistemology
• Decision Theory
• Philosophy of Science

• (forthcoming) “The Value of Evidence in Decision-Making.” The Journal of Philosophy.
• (2024) “It Can Be Rational to Change Priors.” Analysis, 84(4), 822–830.
• (2024) “Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.” Erkenntnis.
• (2023) “Permissivism, The Value of Rationality, and a Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106, 157-175.
• (2023) Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• (2021) “The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.” Episteme 18(4), 654-673.
• (2020) “Higher-Order Defeat and Intellectual Responsibility.” Synthese 197 (12): 5435-5455.
• (2020) “A New Causal-Doxastic Theory of Basing.” In Pat Bondy and Adam Carter (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.
• (2016) “Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3): 563-575.
• (2015) “Fumerton’s Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1): 93-108.