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Life like a Dream – Overdetermined

Freud's Timeliness for a Philosophy of the Life Sciences

Ever since institutionalised philosophy has existed, it has let inspirations from independent thinkers on its peripheries guide it onto new paths. At the end of the 18th century, Hume and Rousseau were, according to Hegel¹, “the two starting points for German philosophy”. At the beginning of the 20th century, Max Weber identified Marx and Nietzsche as the formative figures for his generation.² Since the thirties, Freud has increasingly displaced Nietzsche as a master thinker. Freud himself acted more modestly. He only claimed to have added “some psychological foundation” to the enlightenment provided by his “great predecessors” (XIV, 358 = XXI 35).³ This is reminiscent of Darwin. Darwin was not the first one to advocate the idea of the evolution of the species, including the human species. But he was the first one to provide a genuinely biological explanation for the theory of evolution and thus to help it make a breakthrough. Nowadays, Freud is being read less. Still, in the present transitional situation, when change is in the air, when the sciences of life are claiming to be able to replace physics as the leading discipline in the chorus of the sciences, he is more timely than he has been before. This is the claim that shall guide us through the following presentation.
An Initial Orientation: Freud versus Jung

The answer to the question as to what makes Freud interesting for philosophy will take initial shape when he is compared with Carl Gustav Jung – particularly when one comes from Zürich, Jung’s home town. Jung was Freud's first non-Jewish disciple and later his most eloquent opponent. In the opinion of Freud's followers, who are the predominant party, Freud is superior to Jung on three points:

The first two points are somewhat concealed behind the central role which Freud ascribes to sexuality. For, what does sexuality mean in anthropological terms?

(1) On the one hand, sexuality means sociality, relatedness to other people. Jung's technical term for the maturation process is “individuation”. Freud also says, “Where ‘It’ [the Id] was, ‘I’ [the Ego] should emerge”, but this egogenesis is primarily a process of socialisation. It takes place unavoidably in contact with others, most tellingly in contact with those of the other sex. In the last few decades, developmental psychology has recognised the fundamental significance of the child's prelibidinal experiences of fellowship for its potential for individuation and socialisation, including sexual socialisation. It is, however, possible to compare the relationship of sexual to presexual contacts with the relationship of verbal to non-verbal communication or the relationship of writing to spoken language. Because of their inclusiveness and pointedness, once they have developed, the secondary structures also contribute to the determination of the primary structures, which are more diffuse. Puristic attempts to recover earlier forms in their pure state are not successful. Due to their defensive posture towards what has come later, such attempts remain contrastively fixated on it.

(2) In the second place, sexuality means corporality. The process of anthropogenesis is not a process of increasing spiritualisation, ultimately reaching perfection. The human being is not able to discard its material body and to achieve illumination and bliss without it. Nothing changes in our mental world, in our feeling and thinking, according to the principle of non-reductive naturalism, without there being a change in the physical world. The physical world is not only a condition for mental processes. It also plays a formative role. There are hardly any mental concepts which cannot be demonstrated to be sublimated metaphors and which were not originally designations for bodily processes. “Grasping” is a “manifest” example of this. There would probably not be anything like philosophical trust in the meaning of existence without the experience in early childhood of what social fellowship feels like
for the senses.

The key word “corporality” means, by the way, that the mental life of the human being is not only a matter for its brain, but rather that the person's entire organism goes to determining his mental life, and that by way of this organism, his ecological environment also contributes to determining mental life. Body (German “Leib”) always also means life (“Leben”).

(3) On the third point, the genetic conception of the unconscious, Freud is not merely superior to Jung. Through his innovative use of this concept, he transcends all traditional concepts of the unconscious. For Freud, the unconscious is not something which is pre-given by nature, something innate, which is subject to explanation in physiological terms. Rather, the unconscious is the product of a process which must be interpreted in psychological terms, more particularly a dynamic process which can take on a genuinely compulsive character. What Freud calls the “pre-conscious” by way of contrast to the unconscious properly so called, is also the result of a process of becoming. But there are external, material reasons for the genesis of the pre-conscious: fatigue, the fragility and the limitations of consciousness. There is no reason to resist such an explanation. The emergence of the “Freudian” unconscious, by contrast, is not a passive process. The reason for its emergence is not a complete or partial lack of interest in its substance, but rather a driven interest in repressing it.

Freud redraws the dividing line between nature and nurture. There are unconscious longings which occupy us against our will, even somatic phenomena for which people would consult a physician and request medication, in extreme cases even surgery, but which cannot be explained in physiological terms. They are the result of a mental development for which we ourselves or our fellows – that is, our civilisation – have a share of responsibility. This thinking is genuinely biological; specifically, it is conceived in terms of theory of evolution. Living beings themselves create the preconditions which make it possible for them to develop on new paths and perhaps even to develop to new (emergent) heights. This brings us back into the midst of life sciences and thus to what was announced as the main topic of this essay.

First, however, Freud's limits should also be briefly outlined so as to round off the comparison with Jung. These become apparent when we ask about those groups in which Jung found more resonance and adherents than did Freud. There are three: women, members of non-European civilisations and theoretical physicists.
constellation in itself makes it inviting to examine the concerns of this three groups of adherents.

(1) In Jung's analytical psychology, women are not “deficient beings”, which is how they are presented in Freud's androcentrically oriented psychoanalysis, or, to use the more vivid term used by his French followers: in his phallocentrically oriented psychoanalysis. In Jung's work, the relationship between man and woman is one of complementarity. More importantly, the properties with a complementary relationship to each other are those which in simplifying typologies are attributed exclusively to one of the sexes as “typically feminine” or “typically male”. Accordingly, they have to be cultivated by each person himself or herself as complementary to each other. To express it in Jung's language: each person finds both an anima and an animus in himself or herself.

(2) Analogous claims can be made with respect to non-European civilisations. What we can discover in them is something which we can discover in ourselves at least as a latent disposition. We have only neglected it by reason of ignorance or self-sufficiency, or set it aside because we realise that no person can materialise in himself or herself everything to which he or she has the potential. Like members of the other sex, members of other civilisations are not in essence alien to us. Rather, they are welcome to us as our complementary partners.

(3) Together with a group of theoretical physicists whose favour he was able to gain at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Jung surpassed Freud in an exquisite and symptomatic point. Freud and Einstein also exchanged letters, but in this case the topic was the psychological possibility of a world free of war. In the correspondence between C. G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli, by contrast, the topic was the fundamental structure of the universe, and the psychological constitution of the human being which makes abstract physical knowledge possible. Jung was interested in a deeper level of analysis on which the relation between mind and matter, between psyche and physis seemed to him and his correspondent to be a symmetrical, mirror-image relationship, and in symptomatic cases to be synchronous and acausal. Freud, by contrast, took aim on everyday psychology and everyday pathology. On this higher level, the relationship between “body” and “mental life” is asymmetrical, biased to the body, and through and through subject to genetic (historical and biographical) determination. For all its asymmetry, the relationship is thoroughly interactive. Hence, Freud's debating partners are not theoretical physicists, but rather neurobiologists and neurophysicians. They
want to use medication to achieve what Freud sought to remedy through therapeutic dialogue. The science which comes closest to Freud's psychology is not quantum physics, but rather a revised science of life which no longer has a reductive bias.

**Psychoanalysis in the Context of Philosophy of Life about 1900**

“Life science” is the headword when attempting to understand Freud in the context of the intellectual trends around 1900. The umbrella concept for the intellectual movements which were dominant around that time is “philosophy of life”. The overriding figure, the “super-father”, so to speak, was Friedrich Nietzsche. The most renowned “philosophers of life” in the universities were Wilhelm Dilthey in Germany, Henri Bergson in France and John Dewey in the United States. The philosophers of life attempted to pave a way between the rationalism of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of spirit of German idealism on the one hand and 19th-century empirical psychology on the other hand. The latter attempted to explain intelligent human behaviour exclusively in mechanical-causal terms according to the example of contemporary physics.

Philosophy of life has it that it is not cognitive, but conative processes which are decisive for human behaviour and for the course of history; not insight and reason, but the striving for power and superpower, for life and survival. Human behaviour is accordingly goal and thus future oriented. A phenomenon is no longer explained exclusively by tracing it back to a previous event of which it may be the mechanical effect, but rather through the function which it has in a system or by the meaning which it has for a subject.

The language of the life sciences is full of ambiguities – but not because it is playful or negligent, perhaps for lack of reflection; rather, these are realistic ambiguities which are suited to the phenomena. The propositions of the life sciences always have both a natural-science and a human-science dimension. The breach between explanatory and interpretative sciences does not run between the natural and the human sciences, but rather directly through the life sciences. Biologists cannot work without concepts derived from the human sciences, and human scientists cannot work without concepts from biology. For example, François Jacob wrote: “Living beings can only survive, grow and procreate thanks to an unending flow of material, energy and information.”
Information theory concepts such as symbol, code and program are genuinely human science concepts, and since the middle of the 20th century the life sciences would be inconceivable without them. The key methodological proposition of the human sciences is, “We explain nature, we understand mental life.” It is wrong to interpret this maxim, which Dilthey formulated in 1894\(^5\), such that the expression “mental life” (Seelenleben, literally “the life of the soul”) is regarded simply as an everyday manner of speaking used as a matter of course in the sciences of the time – also by Freud – for something for which today less colourful, but also ontologically less knotty concepts are used such as “mental processes”.

The full multiplicity of the significance which mental processes have, cannot be understood apart from the life context in which they are embedded. The simplest illustration of this is a plain statement: “The lecture is boring.” Somebody who knows only the logical structure of the sentence and the semantics of the words will not understand this sentence. These points are far too commonplace. The sentence also has a teleological significance. It could be understood as a indirect invitation: “Let's leave!” But that is not enough. Human expressions always have a self-reference. This is the real contribution of philosophy of life to hermeneutics, the art of understanding\(^6\). For example, the speaker may make his comment to show off. Or it may also be the case that he is only commenting on what is good for him and that in his behaviour he is ultimately only thinking of himself.

Freud's merit is the radicalisation of the idea of the (logical, teleological and self-referential) significance of all expressions of mental life and a systematic elaboration of their ambiguity. Even dreams, which, in accordance with the spirit of the day in science, are explained only in somatic terms, have meaning. Things which seem to be chaotic and thus meaningless and incomprehensible, do indeed have an order. It is based on an architectonics for which Freud not only proposed an interpretation, but also developed an exemplary new theory of interpretation.

Not all phenomena in life are significant from the beginning. No life is without chance events and accidents. There is, however, nothing from which life is not able to derive significance after the fact. Dogs even make significant use of their waste. They use it to mark their territory. That is what life is like. And it can be explained in biological terms. A meaningful treatment of what happens to one in life, even during sleep, proves to be valuable for survival.
Freud's Key Word: not “Reduction”, but “Overdetermination”

In contradistinction to the physical sciences, the life sciences are antireductionist. A reductive procedure has proved appropriate in mathematics and physics. Accordingly, Ockham's razor is cultivated: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*: entities must not be unnecessarily multiplied. No more ontological categories should be introduced than are absolutely necessary. If effective causes are sufficient for the purpose of explanation, then no final causes should be assumed in addition. If something can be derived from two axioms, then a third is superfluous. Physics explains according to the example of mathematics by tracing things back to initial grounds. Parsimony has proved to be successful in this work. The life sciences, by contrast, adhere to the nature of life and are not exclusively oriented to effective causes, but always to goals, too. This leads to a chronic dispute between the microphysical basic disciplines of biology and its specialised subdisciplines (physiology, theory of evolution, behavioural science), which argue in specifically biological terms. In trying to achieve a goal, it is advantageous to have a number of means. If one means is unavailable, another can be used. If there is a lot of noise, a redundant message is more likely to reach its goal than a sparse one. The ontological maxim of the life sciences is therefore: *Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas*: the variety of manners, kinds and types of being must not be diminished arbitrarily.

There are two more maxims: (a) There are many means to reach a goal (principle of functional equivalence). (b) One and the same means can be used to reach several goals (principle of functional multivalence). This is the formulation of the theoretical framework of the life sciences on the basis of which Freud's psychoanalysis takes philosophical shape. The life sciences are not sciences of parsimoniousness, but sciences of excess and redundancy. As if to illustrate the principles of functional equivalence and multivalence, Freud writes in the *Interpretation of Dreams* (II 290 = IV 284): “Not only are the [manifest] elements of the dream *multiply determined* by the [latent] dream-thoughts, but the individual dream-thoughts are also represented in the dream by several elements. Associative paths lead from one element of the dream to several dream-thoughts, and from one dream-thought to several elements of the dream”.

The model character of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* for the life sciences becomes immediately apparent when his concepts “dream-thought” and “element” are exchanged for relevant biological categories:

“Not only are the phenotypical elements of an organism multiply determined by the genes, the individual genes in an organism are also represented by several phenotypical elements.” Or: “Not only are the structures or organs of a living being multiply determined by the functions or goals, the individual functions or goals can also be represented in the living being by several structures or organs.”

The title “hermeneutics” has become usual for the discipline dealing with the interpretation of meaning. The following claim shall now be advocated: of all hermeneutic scientists in the 20th century, Freud is the least reductionist. The term “reduction”, one of the dominant concepts in the philosophy of the middle of the century, is not contained in the general index of Freud's *Collected Works*. Freud sometimes uses the more colloquial zurückführen (to trace back). But he only uses this expression without reserve when talking about “theoretical constructs” (to use the contemporary terminology) or “creations of the human mind” (to use Freud's language), for example “demons” and “gods” (IX 34 = XIII 24), of which no person (at least no “normal” person) has any direct experience. In the case of such constructs, tracing one thing back to another at once explains away something for the existence of which there is no adequate empirical ground. If, however, Freud speaks of “tracing back” with respect to psychological phenomena, he only means an explanation with reference to the drives for something the “mental reality” (II 625) of which he does not doubt. It is most unambiguous in the case of manifest dream contents. The fact that tracing them back to a “somatic process” is not an adequate explanation is precisely the point of departure of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*. The fact that behind a manifest dream content there is a latent dream thought, which is the topic of dream interpretation, does not by any means mean that the dream content cannot be meaningful when taken for itself. It is precisely when the dream content is taken as it is manifestly presented that the dream censorship comes to its own. There is an interaction between “at least two reasons” (IX 117 = XIII, 95-96), between “a concealed reason, which we must judge to be truly operative and real one” and an evident desire, which is immanent to the psychological system and which must not be neglected, for a “rational and intelligible” (II 538) connectedness of phenomena. Every scientist whose empirical material does not simply and smoothly fit into his theory knows how strong this desire is. The result is
what Freud calls a “secondary revision” with reference to the product of dream work: “There is an intellectual function in us which demands unity, connection and intelligibility from any material, whether of perception or thought, that comes within its grasp; and if, as a result of special circumstances, it is unable to establish a true connection, it does not hesitate to fabricate a false one” (IX 117 = XIII 95).

The philosophers who first attempted to appraise Freud's psychoanalysis came from the phenomenological movement. Like the primary text of psychoanalysis, Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, the primary text of the phenomenological movement, the first volume of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, was published (postdated) in 1900. As in the case of the emergence of psychoanalysis, philosophy of life is significant as the context in which phenomenology emerged. In both cases, the strict analytic nature of the new developments quickly stood in contrast to philosophy of life; in the case of phenomenology, the contrast was also in the topic. But none of the the phenomenological philosophers, neither Husserl nor Heidegger, nor their French successors (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricœur), who very creatively picked up the impulses of psychoanalysis, come to terms with the “extraordinary complexity of all causation in life and history” (XVI 232 = 123) as comprehensively as Freud was concerned to.

**Complex Psychoanalysis**

1. *Drive nature and the life of the soul* — In contrast to Husserl, Freud naturally never bracketed physical reality out in a “phenomenological reduction”; much less did he declare it in idealistic terms to be a mere phenomenon constituted by a transcendental consciousness. It was Paul Ricœur's merit to have shown how the “discours énergétique” and the “discours herméneutique” determine each other in Freud's work. Causal explanations and interpretations of sense are neither independent of each other nor can the one be eliminated in favour of the other. The paths which the “drive nature” (or instinctuality) follow depend on the sense contents of the “mental life”. Without this sense, they cannot be adequately explained.

2. *Formal and material structural factors* — In overcoming associational psychology, Freud does not go so far as to attribute an exclusive formative role in mental processes to the meaning that mental phenomena have for the subject; in this point he is comparable to his contemporary, Husserl, and different from the French
phenomenologists, most eloquently among them Merleau-Ponty. One-dimensional and monocausal explanations are nothing for Freud. Associational relationships, similarity and contiguity are neither sufficient nor necessary factors in structuring “mental life”, but they are not irrelevant factors either (II 246, 358, 596 = IV 240). They have the effect of a “gentle force”. They can be easily exploited or easily disengaged at wish.

3. Conative and cognitive structures — In distinction to Husserl’s classical writings, Freud works on the basis of the primacy of the conative aspects of mental processes vis-à-vis the cognitive elements (as do the classical philosophers of life, and later Scheler and Heidegger). We experience the things in the world as “things ready-to-hand” (Zuhandenes) (to use Heidegger's expressionistic language), as something which has a meaning for us without first perceiving them as things “present-at-hand” (Vorhandenes) of which we must have an objective representation or idea. Since then, research into “artificial intelligence” has shown that machines are autonomously – of their own accord, on the basis of their inner constitution, without support of “physically instantiated representations” – capable of similarly significant (apparently “intelligent”) work of the same kind as observed in living beings, and that it can also be explained without recourse to “inner representations”.

Contrary to Heidegger, however, Freud does not subject representations to the suspicion that they emerge due to a deficiency and that they induce us to a deficient approach to things. Life scientists see in new developments primarily a new potential for creative behaviour. Mental representations are the products of desires and primarily serve their fulfilment. Representations make it possible to direct a desire which cannot be realised immediately so that future satisfaction is possible. Their primary function is a directing and planning function. Without mental representation, human beings would lack “circumspection” – dreamlike world projects. And who would like to do without the aesthetic experiences which he has owing to his mental representations?

4. Object reference and self-reference – Brentano, who paved the way for the phenomenological movement and whose lectures in Vienna Freud occasionally heard, as well as his student Husserl worked out the intentional structure of consciousness as one of its specific characters: consciousness is “consciousness of something”, related to a content. For Heidegger as for Freud, this is too object oriented and not thought out radically enough. In his conception of human existence, Heidegger picks up on the perspective of life philosophy. His philosophical success can to a great extent be
explained by the fact that in the twenties he increasingly ontologised the concepts of life philosophy. Thus, he renders the biological concept of “life” into the ontological concept of “existence”. According to biology, there is a “self-reference” in all life. Animals do not live to work, but work “for the sake of life”. Survival is ultimately decisive for their behaviour. Expressing this in sublimated ontological categories, Heidegger writes that man is a being such that “in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it”. Analogously, he speaks of an “occupation of the animal with itself”, although “without any so-called self-consciousness, much less reflection”. According to Freud, it is no different in the case of human “mental life”: “There thus runs through my thoughts a continuous current of ‘personal reference’, of which I generally have no inkling (IV 30 = VI 24). Thus, for every human action we have to ask what it means for the acting person himself or herself beyond the objective expediency which it obviously has.

Are selfless actions at all possible? This question is of great relevance not only for ethics, but also, and in a manner which is illuminating, for aesthetics. The classical expression of a non-egoistically motivated and highly ethical action is Martin Luther's statement, “Here I stand; I cannot do anything else.” The motivation of action is selfless, but it does not remain unconscious. According to one's character, moral consciousness may breed either haughtiness or humility. It is instructive for moral psychology that mechanical engineers now proclaim that it would be easy for them to build robots – if not real, at least virtual robots – which act “selflessly” in a manner similar to human beings. The question for us living human beings is then: could we be satisfied and happy with such robots, which, with their hardware, wetware and software, are altruistically at our full and total service (including loving service)? According to the classical philosophical view of love, lovers do not find the satisfaction of their longing in “objects” of pleasure, but in another “subject” of pleasure such that in reciprocal love the lover senses emotionally that this other subject is also existentially concerned with himself and his own being (or in extreme cases non-being).

There is a famous aesthetic analysis which anticipates the cyberspace aesthetics of our times and which can help us become aware of nice differences. Heinrich von Kleist believed that the particular charm of dancing puppets had to do with the fact that there is no consciousness accompanying their movements. As compared with living dancers, a puppet has the advantage that “it never behaves affectedly. – For affectation becomes
apparent when the soul (vis motrix) is located at some other point than the centre of gravity of the movement.”¹⁴ But Kleist's choice of words – “to affect” or “to behave affectedly” and “affectation” (Ziererei) – alone is an indication that each property which distinguishes human beings from machines is ambivalent. If such a property can turn out to be an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time, then a linear assessment is no longer possible. There is also a particular charm whose ground is precisely that the dancer is aware of his art and of his effect on us as spectators. This charm can be of a special kind – as we see no later than when our applause is accepted – for the simple reason that we, the spectators, know that the dancer is a human being and not a zombie or a machine. In Kant's posthumous works there is the surprising admission: “One cannot abstract from the sex in the case of a becoming woman.”¹⁵ The distinction between “animate” or “living” and “inanimate” or “non-living” is more widespread in human languages than the distinction between “male” and “female”. The structure of language has often proved to be a reliable heuristic leader through anthropology.

The originality and genesis of a performance is not indifferent to us. Least of all are most of us indifferent about our own origin. That may seem irrational – as if the point were not only who we are, but also where we come from: from a uterus, from a test-tube or from a laboratory that artificially produces biomaterials.

5. “Moral Sense” – In one point, Freud does not think in terms of the life sciences, namely on the question of the innate character of moral sentiments and thus of their “genuine”, that is, phylogenetically explicable autonomy. On this point, he is on the same side as the great majority of 20th-century philosophers. If rational reflection does not yield a sufficient foundation for moral sentiments, then these circles look for a psychogenetic explanation. So did Freud. He attributes them reductionistically to guilt feelings with which one has not come to terms and which are grounded in a rebellion against a person in authority, whether real or just secretly contemplated. It can be an event in one's own childhood or an event in the early period of humanity which is passed down from generation to generation in mythical accounts.

Freud claimed Darwin (in addition to Copernicus) as his predecessor in destroying highhanded illusions, but Darwin thinks differently on this point. Darwin presents a specifically biological reflection, a reflection in terms of theory of evolution, which makes a point in favour of the innate character of moral sentiments. It can be expected
that a living being that lives in a social unit and is accordingly equipped with “social instincts” will develop a moral sense as soon as it possesses intelligence approaching human cognitive abilities.\(^{16}\) For Darwin, moral sentiments are an achievement dating back to the early history of humanity, one which is passed on from generation to generation not in memory, but with the genes.

6. Intellect or Reason – After Freud's psychologically based “genealogy of morals”, it is a surprise to see how antireductionistically and optimistically he thinks about another cognitive faculty, namely about the intellect – “or let us call it by the name that is familiar to us, reason” (XV 185 = XXII 171). In comparison with instinctiveness, the intellect is certainly a weak disposition. But it makes it possible for human beings to transcend themselves: “The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind” (XIV 377 = XXI 53).\(^{17}\)

It would be possible to object that in his late essay “On the Future of an Illusion” (namely religion) Freud simply remained stuck in his own illusion, namely the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Now, the decisive point is not the tradition from which someone drives his convictions. The decisive point is whether it is true or false. It may turn out that finally (“at the end of history”) reason does not get a hearing such that everything makes progress and improves, but rather that an alternative perspective, one that is relative to “age”, gives rise to qualified optimism. In the process of ageing, the majority of people, having become “realistic”, become deaf to the quiet voice of the intellect and permit it to be drowned out by self-interest. But from one generation to the next (or to the next but one?) it does get a hearing from youth who are receptive to ideals. Freud's progressive optimism or the alternative life-science optimism is at its most realistic when there is convergence between reason and self-interest, when, in other words, the problem on which Freud did his pioneering work, the “complexity of all causation in life and history” remains, and when, accordingly, “overdetermination” and not “reduction” can remain the motto of the life sciences.
Notes

1 Hegel 1816/17, 311
2 In a discussion with students in 1920, quoted by Baumgartner, 1964, 554f.
3 Freud’s German works are cited according to the Gesammelte Werke, London, 142ff.: the volume number in Roman numerals, the page numbers in Arabic numerals. The double volume II/III is cited with number II. His English works are cited according to The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud. London 1953-74. The order is thus: German volume number page numer = English volume number page number.
4 Jacob, 1981, 108
5 Dilthey, 1894, 144
6 Holenstein, 1976, 180
7 In German Überdetermination or Überdeterminierung, from the French surdétermination.
8 Holenstein, 1972, 307ff. and 332ff.
9 David Hume’s expression
10 Cf. Kant, 1797, 211
11 Heidegger, 1927, § 4
12 Heidegger, 1929/30, §§ 56ff.
15 Kant, 1923, Nr. 631
16 Darwin, 1871, 101ff.
17 Until a few years ago, a memorial stone in the Sigmund-Freud-Park in Vienna bore the inscription, “The voice of reason is a soft one.” I owe the reference to the two passages in Freud’s writings to Rafael Ferber; linking the essence of the two quotations yielded the conscientious scholarly “correction” of the new inscription. Cf. Holenstein, 1996, 209.
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