

PHIL5150: Seminar on Western Philosophers: Saul Kripke and *Naming and Necessity*

A Preliminary Course Outlines

Time: Thursday 2:30PM - 5:15PM T.C. Cheng Building

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Course Overview

“Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* is widely acknowledged as one of the most important works of twentieth century philosophy.” Timothy Williamson, blurb praise for Kripke’s *Reference and Existence*.

“(When) these lectures [‘Naming and Necessity’] were first published ..., they stood analytic philosophy on its ear. Everybody was either furious, or exhilarated, or thoroughly perplexed. No one was indifferent.” Richard Rorty, *London Review of Books*

“In the philosophy of language, Naming and Necessity is among the most important works ever, ranking with the classical work of Frege in the late nineteenth century, and of Russell and Tarski in the first half of the twentieth century.” Scott Soames, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*.

This course is a graduate seminar focusing on a set of issues generated by *Naming and Necessity* and some other related writings by Kripke. These issues fall in more than one area, particularly modal logic, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, metaphysics, and their intersections. The primary readings are (a) *Naming and Necessity* and several other works by Kripke and (2) a collection of writings representing some of the major responses to, or developments of, Kripke's ideas and arguments.

Assessment: Class presentation and participation (40%) and two essays (30% each).

Selected Bibliography:

Works by Kripke:

- 1959. “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic”, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 24(1):1–14.
- 1962. “The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory”, *Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 8:113–116
- 1963. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 16:83–94
- 1963. “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I: Normal Modal Propositional Calculi”, *Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik* 9:67–96
- 1971. “Identity and Necessity”, In *Identity and Individuation*, edited by M. K. Munitz, New York University Press.
- 1972/80. *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press.
- 1975. “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, *Journal of Philosophy* 72:690–716.
- 1976. “Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?”, In *Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics*, edited by Gareth Evans and John McDowell,

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1977. "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 2: 255-76.
1979. "A Puzzle about Belief", In *Meaning and Use*, edited by A. Margalit, Reidel.
1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an Elementary Exposition*, Harvard University Press.
2005. "Russell's Notion of Scope", *Mind* 114:1005–1037.
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Other publications:

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- Bennett, J. (2003). *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*, Clarendon Press.
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- Davies, M. & I. Humberstone (1980). "Two Notions of Necessity", *Philosophical Studies* 38, 1-30
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- Dummett, M. (1978). *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckworth.
- Dummett, M. (1981). *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, Harvard University Press.
- Dummett, M. (1993). *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, Harvard University Press.
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- Frege, G. (1892/1952). "On Sense and Reference," in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), *Translations from the Works of Gottlob Frege*, Blackwell.
- Garcia-Carpintero, M. & J. Macia (2006). *Two Dimensional Semantics*, Oxford University Press.
- Garson, J. (1984). "Quantification in Modal Logic", in Gabbay, D., and Guenther, F. (eds.) *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, 2.5, D. Reidel.
- Hughes, C. (2004). *Kripke*, Oxford University Press.
- Hughes, G. & M. Cresswell (1996). *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*, Routledge.
- Jackson, F. (1998). *From Metaphysics to Ethics*, Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, F. (ed) (1991). *Conditionals*, Clarendon Press.
- Jackson, F. (1998a). 'Reference and Description Revisited', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 12: 201-218.
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- Jackson, F. (2010) *Language, Names, and Information*, Wiley-Blackwell.
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- Lewis, David K. (2001). *On the Plurality of World*, Wiley-Blackwell.
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