

Reading List And Information For Four Seminars At CUHK

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The philosophy of language changed forever with the publication of Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* and Hilary Putnam's 'The Meaning of "Meaning"'. We can all agree about that. But there is a lively debate over precisely what we learn from those seminal works and the literature they spawned. These four seminars will be concerned with one part of the debate, the part most particularly concerned with the description theory of reference for names. I belong to the party that holds that the description theory of reference was transformed but not eliminated: the party the opposition think of as failing to see how deep the Kripke-Putnam revolution cuts into traditional views of meaning and reference. In particular, I am one of the minority (?) who hold that we do not learn that the reference of names does not go by descriptions but rather that it does not go by the descriptions that first come to mind when the name is mentioned, and, in addition, that we learn that anchoring or centering is rife.

The discussion will be set against a representationalist view of mind and language and we will note along the way some lessons from our discussion for the debate over broad and narrow content, and certain identity claims concerning colour and mental content.

You are not expected to read all the material below but it would be good if you had some familiarity with Kripke and Putnam (obviously). I will bring with me versions of a number of my papers listed below.

The seminars will be given as informal talks to ppt.

Bennett, Jonathan (1976) *Linguistic Behaviour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Braddon-Mitchell, David and Frank Jackson (1996) *The Philosophy of Mind and*

Cognition, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1966) 'He*': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness', *Ratio*, 8: 130–157.

Chalmers, David (1996) *The Conscious Mind*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, David (2002) 'The Components of Content' in *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, New York: Oxford University Press, ed. David J. Chalmers: 608–633.

Devitt, Michael (1996) *Coming to our Senses*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny (1987) *Language and Reality*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Doris, John M. and Stich, Stephen P. (2005) 'As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics', in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evans, Gareth (1982) *The Varieties of Reference*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Grice, H. P. (1969) 'Vacuous Names', in *Words and Objections*, ed. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 118–145.

Grice, H. P. (1957) 'Meaning', *Philosophical Review*, 66: 377-88.

Jackson, Frank (1998) *From Metaphysics to Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Frank (2003) 'Narrow Content and Representationalism – or Twin Earth Revisited', Patrick Romanell Lecture, *Proceedings American Philosophical Association*, 77, 2: 55–71.

Jackson, Frank (2004) 'Why We Need A-intensions', *Philosophical Studies*, 118, 1-2: 257–277.

Jackson, Frank (2005) 'What are Proper Names For?', in *Experience and Analysis*, Proc. 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2004, ed. Johann C. Marek and Maria E. Reicher, Vienna: hpt-öbv.

Jackson, Frank (2006) 'Representation, Truth, Realism', *Monist*, 89, 1: 51–63.

- Jackson, Frank (forthcoming) 'The Epistemological Objection to Opaque Teleological Theories of Content', *Teleosemantics*, ed. Graham Macdonald and David Papineau, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, Frank 1997 'II – Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. 71, 269-282.
- Jackson, Frank, 'Reference and Description Revisited', *Philosophical Perspectives*, vol. 12, *Language, Mind, and Ontology*, ed. James E Tomberlin, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1998, pp. 201–18.
- Jackson, Frank, Oppy, Graham and Smith, Michael (1994) 'Minimalism and Truth Aptness', *Mind* 103, 287-302.
- Kripke, Saul (1980, 2nd ed.) *Naming and Necessity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Kroon, Fred (1987) 'Causal Descriptivism', *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 65: 1–17.
- Kroon, Fred (2004) 'Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problem', *Philosophical Review*, 113: 1–30.
- Lewis, David (1969) *Convention*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Lewis, David (1979) 'Score-Keeping in a Language Game', *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 8: 339–59.
- Lewis, David (1979) 'Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*,' *Philosophical Review*, 88: 513–543.
- Lewis, David (1984) 'Putnam's Paradox', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 62: 221–36.
- Lewis, David (1997) 'Naming the Colours', *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 75: 325-342.
- Lewis, David (1969) *Convention*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Linsky, Leonard (1977) *Names and Descriptions*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Locke, John (1690) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Ch. II, § 2.
- Neale, Stephen (1990) *Descriptions*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Perry, John (1993) *The Problem of the Essential Indexical*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Perry, John (1982) 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', *Nous*, 13: 3–21.

Putnam, Hilary (1962) 'The Analytic and the Synthetic', in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, eds, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Putnam, Hilary (1975) 'The meaning of 'Meaning'', in *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John (1983) *Intentionality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slote, Michael (1966) 'The Theory of Important Criteria', *Journal of Philosophy*, 63: 211–24.

Soames, Scott (2002) *Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Soames, Scott (2005) *Reference and Description*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stalnaker, R. (1984) *Inquiry* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press)

Stalnaker, R. (1999) *Context and Content*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stalnaker, R. (2001) 'On Considering a Possible World as Actual', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 75, Ch. XII. Reprinted in Stalnaker (2003: 188–200)

Stalnaker, R. (2003) *Ways a World Might Be* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Stalnaker, R. (2003a) 'Conceptual Truth and Metaphysical Necessity' in Stalnaker (2003: 201–215)

Stalnaker, R. (2003b) 'On Thomas Nagel's Objective Self' in Stalnaker (2003: 253–275)

Strawson, P. F. (1959) *Individuals*, London, Methuen.

Strawson, P. F. (1971) *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, London, Methuen.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1963) *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.