Who is Who in Heidegger’s Who’s Analysis of Being and Time?

Professor WANG Qingjie The Chinese University of Hong Kong

One of the major criticisms against Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time claims that Heidegger’s Dasein, though existential, is still a “subjective” Dasein. In this essay I would like to defend Heidegger against the above charge by a careful reading of Heidegger’s “who-analysis” in Being and Time. I shall claim that his theory of “being-with” and his sharp criticism of the “public-ness” of das Man is not a proof of the solipsist character of his thought. It is rather a proof of its anti-subjective character. The key point missed by many critics is the distinction between “public” and “community,” and between “ego-nomy” and “auto-nomy.” I conclude that the anti-subjective character of Heidegger’s theory of being-with could lead us to a new interpretation of Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world-with-one-another” as the “existential communal being.” This “communal being” is the ontological and existential status of each one of us, and grounds the true individuality, i.e., individual uniqueness and autonomy.